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A Zambian does construction work at China Luanshya Mine as a
Chinese manager looks on. China Luanshya Mine is one of four copper
mining companies in Zambia operated by the Chinese parastatal China
Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company. From the HRW report.
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A November 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on labor abuses in mining firms in Zambia parented by state-owned enterprise (SOE)
China Non-ferrous Metal Mining Co. (CNMC) has been a media sensation.1
CNMC subsidiaries operate two copper mines and two copper
processing plants in Zambia：Non-Ferrous Company Africa
(NFCA), CNMC-Luanshya Copper Mines (CLM), Chambishi
Copper Smelter (CCS), and Sino Metals Leach Zambia (Sino
Metals). In 2010 CNMC’s two mines accounted for 4.5% of the
copper concentrate produced by foreign companies in Zambia
and 4.2% of Zambia’s total. Myriad news outlets and blogs
have reported HRW’s conclusions about CNMC: that the
Chinese firms are 'bad employers' compared to the five
Western-based major foreign investors in Zambia’s copper
mining industry; that they have the worst record on the safety
of workers, pay, hours and union rights. Despite HRW’s focus
on one industry in one country, the report provokes inferences
that accord with the larger, highly-skewed Western discourse of
'China-in-Africa.'2 Indeed, HRW asserts (p.1) that its report
'begin[s] to paint a picture of China’s broader role in Africa.'
 
HRW investigations are widely assumed to be empirically
accurate, methodologically sophisticated and politically neutral.
We challenge these assumptions with respect to the HRW
report on CNMC in Zambia, which draws empirically problematic
conclusions and uses a dubious methodology.
Throughout the world, and notably throughout Africa and Asia,
mining is dangerous and often low paid work with long working hours, particularly for irregular workers. These are serious problems to be
addressed by workers and governments in all countries and internationally. The issue reviewed here, however, is the assessment of Chinese
mines in comparison with other foreign-owned mines in Zambia.
 
Readers of the HRW report may be overwhelmed by its basis in interviews with miners. We do not wholly dismiss concrete observations made
by interviewees about rights deficiencies they experienced, such as having to work in unsafe conditions. CNMC firms employ some 6,000
workers and Zambia’s total mining work force is almost ten times as large.3 Those interviewed by HRW included some 95 who had worked only
at a CNMC firm and 48 who had worked elsewhere. Those who worked only in a CNMC firm or only in a non-CNMC firm cannot, however,
reliably infer from their own experiences that CNMC operations are less safe than elsewhere.
 
Miners who formerly worked at other mines and now work at CNMC mines may not necessarily make sound comparisons either, as observations
of safety practices experienced by a worker at another mine, such as the UK/Indian-owned Konkola Copper Mine (KCM) in 2008 and then at
NFCA in 2011, do not tell us about safety practices at NFCA in 2008 or KCM in 2011.More importantly, the HRW report does not tell readers
whether those  interviewees who worked at a non-CNMC firm before moving to a CNMC one were contract or permanent workers when they
worked at the non-CNMC firm. This is significant because contract workers generally have much  worse experiences with safety as well as lower
pay and fewer benefits. Many, if not all, HRW interviewees who worked first at a non-CNMC firm and then at a CNMC company had been
permanent employees when they worked at the non-CNMC mine. After being laid off in 2008-2009, they were hired by a CNMC firm. Thus, they
had  experienced only the better safety conditions of permanent employees while at the non-CNMC firm and not the worse safety conditions
that contract workers at these firms experience. In making judgments about comparative safety conditions, they therefore could not represent
the experiences of non-CNMC workers as a whole. Despite HRW’s claims then, its miner interviewees could not speak authoritatively about how
safety at CNMC firms compare to safety at other firms.
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HRW relies on interviews as the method of investigation. Interviews can be very useful for investigating specific incidents of abuse, but
exclusive reliance on interviews is insufficient to draw general conclusions about the extent of abuse, still less does it enable understanding of
comparative implications. That research objective can only be achieved by supplementing interviews with survey data from a range of mining
companies.
 
Inferences of 'worst practices' drawn by interviewees about Chinese-owned firms are also highly suspect. A climate of intense anti-Chinese
prejudice was whipped up from 2005-2011, especially in mining areas, by then-opposition leader and now Zambian president Michael Sata
and his Patriotic Front, in order to advance their election campaigns.4 Studies show that racialized discourse shapes attitudes and distorts
evaluations on a wide range of issues.5
 
The HRW report itself contains internal contradictions. It makes
generalizations that cannot be supported by the specifics that it
provides. For example, the report  generalizes (p. 24)  that
“Chinese copper mining companies offer pay base salaries
around one-fourth of their competitors’ for the same work.” 
There is no qualification that this applies only to CNMC
processing plants, where just 20% of CNMC firm employees
work.  The report’s annex on wages differentiates however
between pay in CNMC’s processing plants and its underground
mines.  Contradiction also exists between the report and
generalizations about the report made by the report’s author
himself (not to speak of the media), as we show below,
concerning the issue of the number of hours required of
workers. In both instances, the generalization makes out the
CNMC firms to be worse than they are. This creates a
methodological and political problem: while the report is specific
regarding some details, at the same time it generalizes the
worst to characterize CNMC practices, thus encouraging even
more general inferences about Chinese practices in Africa. In
this article we examine conditions at CNMC and throughout the mining industry with an eye both to gauging levels of abuse and assessing
worst case charges.
 
HRW’s Simplistic Safety Comparisons
Days after HRW issued its CNMC study, the president of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) Oswell Munyenyembe responded to it by
saying that 'his union cannot entirely blame the Chinese companies because other mining houses are equally culprits.' He added: 'We cannot
wholesomely condemn the Chinese-owned mining houses. Remember when we had the global crisis no worker was retrenched at any Chinese
mine [unlike at other mines]. Yes, they have their own problems like mistreating workers and not following labor laws, but other mining houses
are also culprits in this area. It is not only the Chinese mining companies.'6
 
The MUZ president thus disputed HRW’s central argument: that CNMC, among the foreign investors dominating Zambian mining, is almost
uniquely culpable of abusing workers’ rights.
The single most important measure of whether a mining company is deficient in safety compared to other firms is whether (other things being
equal) that firm accounts for a large disproportion of fatalities. Mining firms in Zambia cannot avoid reporting deaths. Injuries may go
unreported, but serious ones correlate with fatalities, most as a result of rock falls.7 Given the small number of fatalities that occur in Zambian
mines, comparisons of fatality rates between different firms are not significant. However, a comparison between fatalities at CNMC firms and the
cumulative total for all foreign-owned copper firms for 2001-2011 is a reliable way to determine whether CNMC’s safety record is extraordinarily
bad.
Statistics provided by the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) on fatalities in all foreign-owned copper mines and for CNMC-owned operations
indicate that CNMC is unexceptional. 
 
Mining fatalities in Zambia and any other country of course
represent a serious problem. The figures are not, however,
especially high by world standards; Zambia is not among the 60
most dangerous countries for miners listed by the International
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’
Unions. The ICEM noted, for example, that “The year 2010 . . . saw
the gruesome deaths of 29 miners at the Pike River coal mine in
New Zealand, caused perhaps by ventilation fans located inside
mine shafts instead of outside. Twenty-nine miners also died in the
US on 5 April 2010 at the Upper Big Branch mine in the state of
West Virginia, a tragedy that saw mine owner Massey Energy and
its CEO shift blame – unbelievably – to the stringent safeguards
enshrined in the US Mine Safety and Health Act.”9
In 2010-2011, there are about 55,000 workers in Zambia’s foreign-owned mines, of whom 10.5 percent, or 5850, work for CNMC’s two mining
Zambian workers 580 meters below the ground in Luanshya Copper
Mine run by the Chinese company China Non-Ferrous Metal Company.
companies. CNMC-firm fatalities in Zambia - 11.5 percent of the country’s total from 2001 to late 2011 - are not a very disproportionate number,
which contradicts the claim that CNMC mines’ safety conditions are markedly worse than its industry peers.
HRW asserts that the supposedly worst conditions at CNMC firms 'stem largely from the attitude of Chinese owned and run companies in
Zambia, which have tended to treat safety and health measures as trivial' and which 'appear to be exporting abuses along with investment.'
The death toll in non-ferrous mining in China is much higher (about 83 miners per 100,000 miners in 2009)10 than that in Zambia (about 30 per
100,000 for 2008-2011). As CNMC-owned firms do not have an especially high fatality rate by Zambian standards, the assertion that CNMC
exports safety abuses does not mesh with its record in Zambia.
Explaining CNMC’s safety outcomes only in terms of attitudes is in any case simplistic. The relative number of fatalities is not determined solely
by the level of safety consciousness of mining firms. It is also the product of operational configurations of mines. Underground mines typically
have more casualties than open cast (open pit) mines. The deeper underground mining goes, the greater the likelihood of rock falls and
casualties.11 CNMC firms have two mines in Zambia: CNMC’s Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFCA) has Chambishi, which at over a thousand
meters is a deep underground mine. CNMC Luanshya (CLM), at least 580 meters deep, is also underground. (An open pit mine being
developed in Luanshya is scheduled to begin operations in 2012.) Underground  mining is not only more dangerous, but also more costly, so it
negatively impacts wages as well as safety. While the difference in the dangerousness of underground, compared to open-pit mining in Zambia
cannot be determined due to difficulties in disaggregating the available data, based on data on all U.S. mines fatalities in recent years, the
fatality rate of underground mining is nearly 3 times that of surface (open-pit) mining.12
 
No other large Zambian copper mining firm has only
underground mines; some have open cast mines and some are
mixed underground/open cast operations. Konkola Copper
Mine (KCM) is owned by Vedanta, the UK Indian major. KCM
Nchanga open pit mine (55 percent of production), plus KCM
Nchanga underground mine (45 percent) had 32 fatalities from
2001-2011, while KCM Konkola, an underground mine, had 31
fatalities. Mopani Copper Mine (MCM) is owned by the
Switzerland-based mining and metals trading giant Glencore.
MCM Nkana has underground and open cast mines and had
55 fatalities from 2001-2011, while MCM Mufilira, an
underground mine, had 27 fatalities.13
 
Skill levels also affect safety and they are lower at CNMC mines
than at other mines.  In large measure this is because most
other mines have been open continuously, thereby creating
more skilled and experienced workers, while both the mines
now operated by CNMC were closed for long period before the
company acquired them. NFCA’s Chambishi mine was closed
for thirteen years and the Luanshya mine was closed from
2000 to 2004 when it was owned by the Binani Group of India and closed again from 2008 to 2009 by its owner Switzerland-UK-based
J&W/Enya.  
When copper prices increase, expansion occurs and fatalities tend to rise as new workers are brought in to expand production. For 22 months,
from October 2006-August 2008, NFCA had zero-fatalities, a rarity in the industry. When asked about its fluctuating record, CEO Wang Chunlai
explained that, “Before, we only had one ore body to work on; now we have two [and] now we go down to more than 1,000 meters. The ceiling
there gets unstable and that can create injury . . . As the scale of work enlarges, we’ve recruited more new workers, so our training may be
lagging and we have to invest more in training.'14 As to CLM, the director of Zambia’s Mine Safety Department (MSD) told us that it had the
industry’s best dust abatement system15and from June 2009-December 2010, CLM had only one fatality.16
 
Unsafe conditions of service remain an industry-wide problem, as detailed in a study by John Lungu of Copperbelt University and Alastair
Fraser of Oxford University.17 There have also been firm-specific studies of Chibuluma mine under South Africa’s Metorex firm,18 KCM,19 and
MCM20 that have shown substantial safety problems. In a 2011 interview with us, the MSD Chief Inspector of Mines spoke negatively of NFCA,
but only of its first five years in operation (2003-2008), when he said it 'was the worst mine in terms of safety. It didn’t want to do sufficient
support work. And it didn’t have proper ventilation.' Now, however, 'NFCA is OK' in terms of safety, so 'NFCA no longer stands out.'21
No one, including CNMC, asserts there are no safety problems at its Zambia facilities and, at these and other mines, such problems require
urgent attention. Taking into account fatality figures and differences in the configuration of mines however, there is no basis to claim that
CNMC is the worst in terms of safety. To do so serves mainly to reinforce hoary racist stereotypes which have endured for more than a century
in the West and have been spread to Africa, that Chinese are cruel and have a disregard for human life.22
 
 
Wages and Hours: The Exaggerated Gap?
CNMC still has to catch up on pay, but there is a narrowing trend. In a 2011 interview, John Lungu compared miners’ basic salaries at the two
CNMC Zambia mines with the country’s largest foreign mining firms.
‘MCM and KCM are the best payers among the mine owners. But the Chinese have responded to criticisms. The lowest wage in Chambishi
Kansanshi mine
went up from 400,000 Kwacha to K1.5 million and there’ve been later increments . . . Chinese companies have not caught up completely with
the Western companies in terms of incomes in the mines, but they’re not lagging behind too much. There’s been substantial improvement.’23
KCM and MCM each have workforces around three times the CNMC mines’ total workforce and produced, in 2010, 5-13 times the amount of
copper concentrate (138,000 tons for KCM and 98,000 tons for MCM versus 22,000 tons for NFCA and 10,000 tons for CLM).24 But apart from
the global tendency of large, more productive enterprises to pay better wages than smaller, less productive ones,25 there are Zambia-specific
reasons why there is still a wage gap between CNMC and larger Western-based mining firms. One is the costs of rehabilitating Chambishi,
which was closed for 13 years and flooded before CNMC acquired it, and refurbishing the antiquated Luanshya mine, which had been
neglected and then abandoned by previous owners.26 There are also differences in the copper content of mining concessions that affect wage
levels. A section engineer at Chambishi Mine told us in 2008 that, 'With 1.8 percent copper content, the former [owner] didn’t think it was worth
their while to mine it. 1.8 percent in Zambia is considered a tail [leftovers] mine. They don’t think it was worth their effort if it’s lower than 3
percent. Other mines have 4 or 5 percent.'27
Deep underground operations and lower copper content make CNMC production more labor intensive, with lower productivity. NFCA and CLM
together produced 4.7 percent of the Zambian foreign-owned copper industry’s concentrate in 2010, but had 10.5 percent of its workforce.
NFCA and CLM’s productivity is thus much lower than industry averages in both Zambia and China. In the table below, the total number of
workers in Zambia includes permanent and non-permanent workers employed by foreign-owned mines and their contractors.
We asked CEO Wang Chunlai about NFCA’s reputation for low
wages. He responded that, 'Wage levels have to do with the scale
[size] and age of the enterprise. In terms of scale, we’re ranked
number five and in terms of cost of labor, number five or six [as]
salary increases are a cumulative annual percentage . . . NFCA is
labor intensive. This can be compared in terms of tons per workers.'
There are stark differences in productivity measured that way:
Canadian-owned Kansanshi produced 232,000 tons of copper
concentrate in 2010 with about 3,500 workers, while NFCA
produced 22,000 tons with the same number.29 Wang noted that
CLM provides higher pay than NFCA because it is an older
enterprise and was taken over; thus it has workers who have
accumulated many years of service and have higher salaries, but
starting pay at CLM is about the same as for NFCA.30
Other reasons for wage differentials emerged in our interviews. The
National Union Mineworkers and Allied Workers (NUMAW) chairman
at Chambishi Mine told us in 2008 that, 'The government is
responsible for the slow pay rise. It issues a benchmark every
year and dictates the percentage of increase, for example 15
percent. It announced that the inflation rate in 2007 was 9.8
percent. The government is actually afraid that much of an
increase in wages will destabilise the single-digit inflation. The
management relies on the government benchmark to negotiate
pay raises with workers'.31
HRW claims (p. 24) that 'Chinese copper mining companies
often pay base salaries around one-fourth of their competitors’
base salary for the same work.' CNMC Company officials have
said NFCA’s overall average basic pay is about half that at
KCM32 while at CLM it is about 80% of KCM’s level, the
industry’s highest.33 CNMC’s statements, which cover mines
where 80% of CNMC Zambia employees work may be accurate,
however, because workforces at KCM, MCM and other mines
include many low-paid contract workers, while NFCA and CLM
aver that almost all their workers are permanent
employees.34 Specifically, half the 16,560 employees at MCM in
November 2011 were contract workers.35 Of the 19,000 workers
at KCM in mid-2011, 12,000 were permanent and 7,000 were
contract workers.36
Zambia’s Deputy Commissioner of Labor has stated that contract workers may get as little as one-fourth the pay of permanent
employees37 and indeed '[L]abor offices have recorded a number of reports especially in areas such as Mopani Copper Mines and Konkola
Copper Mines where several sub-contracted companies have been paying below the government's minimum wage requirements,'38 which is
even less than a fourth of permanent employee salaries. For example, in late 2011 MCM miners reportedly were 'typically paid' three British
pounds per day. That’s a surprisingly low figure, but only if one forgets that half of MCM’s workforce is contract workers.39 If contract workers’
low salaries at non-CNMC mines are taken into account, there may still be a gap, but not a huge one, between CNMC wages and those
elsewhere. MUZ informed us, moreover, that CNMC intends to reach the “industry standard” in salaries in 2012.40
The HRW report author writes elsewhere that 'Several Chinese-run copper mining companies require miners to work brutally long hours – 72-
hour work weeks for some, 365 days without an off day for others . . . '41 This grossly over-generalizes the report’s actual finding and Western
media have expectedly played up this 'cruel Chinese' theme. It is sweepingly inaccurate: the HRW report itself (p. 4) states only that 'Miners in
certain departments at Sino Metals [one of the smaller CNMC firms] work 72-hour weeks without sufficient overtime [pay], while those in other
departments work 365 days a year . . .' The report (p. 78) is unclear on how many workers have long hours, which affect workers in only some
Sino Metals departments, not 'several' firms and certainly not most CNMC workers, 80 percent of whom work eight-hour regular shifts in the
Luanshya and Chambishi mines.
The actual story of hours worked by Zambian miners does not at all correspond to the impression HRW conveys of Chinese work-‘til-you-drop
bosses in contrast to enlightened managers at Western-based firms. In 2007, KCM miners reported they worked more than eight hours, often
up to 12 hours, without overtime pay.42 In 2008, a Zambian seeking work at Chambishi said that 'his countrymen prefer to be employed by the
[Chinese-owned] NFCA rather than other foreign companies. They say they would rather work the eight hours demanded of them by the NFCA
than the 12 hours which is commonplace in other companies.'43 In 2009, KCM miners worked four 12-hour days, then two days off.44
Cartoon by Gado (Godfrey Mwampembwa), one of Africa's most influential cartoonists.
In 2010, a magazine report about Zambia’s large Lumwana mine, then owned by an Australian firm and now by Canadian mining giant Barrick
Gold, profiled a permanent employee miner who stated that she and her colleagues work four 12-hour day shifts, then four 12-hour night
shifts, followed by four days off.45 The miner noted that in earlier years, they worked 10-hour or even 8-hour shifts, but that hours have
increased because now “in the operations and production phrase, we are facing a lot of pressure.”  Zambian “bloggers” have said that miners
at the large, Canadian-owned Kansanshi Mine work 12-hour shifts, but these claims need to be confirmed.46 A 2011 UK newspaper account
noted MCM miners 'toil six-and-a-half days a week in the rock underneath Mufulira,' that is, more hours per week than do NFCA or CLM
underground miners and, in effect, up to 365 days a year.47 Presumably, thousands of miners at MCM work that schedule, while the number of
workers at CNMC Sino Metals who HRW said work every day, is apt to be very much smaller. In any case, all media reports about the HRW
study that we have seen predictably assert that long shifts are a general practice of Chinese-owned mining firms – and Chinese-owned mining
firms alone – in Zambia. At the same time, the HRW report itself tells readers that they should infer something from it about Chinese practices in
Africa more generally.
The Union Question
HRW has charged that the two smaller of the four CNMC firms it investigated, Sino-Metals and Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS), deny workers
the right to join MUZ. Yet, at least one of the two unions (MUZ and NUMAW) is recognized at all four firms and 80 percent of CNMC workers
can choose between them as their bargaining agent, although the two unions bargain jointly with management. NUMAW had 1,000-plus
members and MUZ 400 at NFCA in August 2011; MUZ had 1,700 members and NUMAW 400 at CLM.48 The ruling Patriotic Front (PF) is
popular among miners and both unions have PF supporters and critics among their leaders.
The facts thus far do not support the claim that CNMC firms are hostile to MUZ because it supports PF. The reason why MUZ is recognized by
NFCA and CLM, but not by the two CNMC processing firms needs more investigation and HRW should have left it at that. In fact, all mining
firms regard unions as problems to the extent they protect workers and as helpmates to the extent that they discourage strikes and protests,
which both MUZ and NUMAW often do. What has most devastated union activism in Zambian mining was the drastic decline in membership
due to retrenchment during the financial crisis. MUZ’s membership dropped from 26,000 before the crisis to 12,000 in August 2011.49 The non-
Chinese foreign-owned mines and contractors layed off 19,000 workers, or 30% of the copper mining workforce total of 63,000, in less than
one year between 2008 and 2009.50 When other firms retrenched or closed operations during the crisis, CNMC firms promised 'three nots' (san
bu): not to reduce investment, not to cut down on production and not to lay off workers. Rather, CNMC bought the Luanshya mine, which had
been shuttered by its Swiss owner at the peak of the crisis. It re-hired laid-off workers and hired hundreds more, which belies HRW’s claim that
CNMC is a 'bad employer' compared to the five other major foreign investors in Zambian mining. The nickel-mining firm Albidon Ltd., with the
Chinese SOE Jinchuan owning 51 percent of its shares, indefinitely suspended operations in November, 2011, due to a sharp decline in nickel
prices and technical problems, but it continues to pay full salaries to its 2,000 employees.
Conclusion
Why does HRW focus on labor abuses at CNMC firms in Zambia? Labor abuse at CNMC firms and others in Zambia’s copper industry is
deplorable. But it is not exceptional in the context of the African continent, which like many other parts of the world, experiences massive
human rights violations, including grave labor rights violations. CNMC’s practices, seen in the context of the Zambia copper industry, are worse
in some respects (pay), about the same in other respects (safety), and better in still other respects (job security). They also show signs of
improving. There should be improvements across the board for mine workers in Zambia, who still receive a subsistence wage and live in
underserviced communities, a possibility made less, rather than more likely when Chinese firms are singled out and erroneously accused of
being the worst.
Conditions for millions of miners on the continent are so egregious that the African Union Commission on Human Rights and People’s Rights
stated in 2010 that, 'Mine workers in most parts of Africa work in deplorable conditions often prone to accidents.'51 At the same time, there has
been no shortage of critical studies of labor practices in the CNMC mines in Zambia,52 which employ one-tenth of one percent of the country’s
workforce. HRW is thus barking up the wrong tree. Its exclusive focus on CNMC firms in Zambia as the worst labor abuser serves no useful
purpose. Rather, it plays into the racial hierarchy in Zambia and beyond by calling its report 'a magnifying lens' for Chinese labour practices in
Africa (p. 13). It also reinforces erroneous notions promoted by Western media and politicians, such as Hillary Clinton and David
Cameron,53 that China is a 'neo-colonialist' power in Africa, while Western states and NGOs are the guarantors of human rights.
HRW has issued many reports criticizing Chinese government practices.  We have no general problem with critiques of the Chinese
government. We do take issue with the fact that while HRW criticizes the Chinese government per se, its reports on Western entities mostly
focus on specific private companies or errant government officials.  That is so even though Western governments are responsible for massive
human rights violations through wars and support for numerous authoritarian regimes in the world.
We were informed by the report’s author that the HRW report on CNMC in Zambia was written in response to calls by media, policy makers and
human rights people who wanted to know HRW’s view about Chinese practices in Africa.  HRW should have rejected the very idea of
undertaking a study that singles out a Chinese firm, especially given the global context of repeated Western state and media attacks on
“China” and “the Chinese.”
HRW decided that its first firm-level study of a Chinese investment in Africa would examine an SOE that has had some problematic labor
practices in Zambia, but also has uniquely been the subject of long-running, inaccurate, and racialized attacks by biased Western and partisan
Zambian media.  Western media have portrayed CNMC activities in Zambia as exemplifying the malpractices of Chinese investors throughout
Africa and it was thus easy to predict that media reports about HRW’s study would pour oil on the fire of anti-China/anti-Chinese sentiment.
KCM open pit mine
They have -- and so much so that China’s media-savvy ambassador to Zambia was heard to comment that “in the ‘Western media’ . . .  if you
have not written something bad about China in a given day, then you have not done your job . . .”54
HRW approached its study of CNMC differently from other firm-level studies of copper mining in Zambia.  NGOs that studied KCM did so
“because of its sheer size.” Their report demonstrates that the development of Zambia copper mining has not benefited society at large, but
has brought suffering and disadvantages.55 They did not focus on KCM because it is UK- or ethnic Indian-owned; nor did they distinguish KCM
from other industry firms. A more recent study of MCM’s behavior, while very specific about it, fundamentally questions “the link between
development and mining in general” and points out that MCM is “far from a stand-alone case.”56
In contrast, HRW makes CNMC an extraordinary case, in effect
constructing a binary of CNMC vs. the rest (despite some
qualifications). Ignoring structural conditions, such as mine
configurations, scale of operation, labor-intensiveness of
production, HRW interprets CNMC behavior by spuriously
claiming that Chinese do not care about safety, are exporting
their malpractices from China to Africa, etc. Further, unlike other
firm-level studies, although it focuses on one company, the
HRW report (p. 13) is self-described as “a useful magnifying
lens into Chinese labor practices in Africa.” It thus makes a
Chinese SOE, by way of example, a strikingly negative example
of Chinese investment in Africa. 
Martin Luther King was once confronted by claims that Jewish
landlords and shopkeepers exploit African-Americans. He
responded by stating that “The Jewish landlord or shopkeeper
is not operating on the basis of Jewish ethics; he is operating
on the basis of a marginal businessman” and that the solution
“is for all people to condemn injustice wherever it
exists.”57 Thus, alternatively, HRW could have undertaken a
study of labor rights violations in Zambian mining. That would
likely have found, as the president of MUZ observed in
response to HRW’s report, that violations are common in mining generally.  Instead, HRW erroneously maintains that that CNMC trivializes
safety, seeks to export China-based mining practices to Zambia, and is a singularly “bad employer” of Zambian labor.  That can only have the
effect of bolstering longstanding anti-Chinese racism, which is based, in significant part, on notions of Chinese cruelty and disregard for human
life.
Some readers may think that HRW’s report cannot be accused of racism because it does not claim that CNMC’s practices are racially or
culturally rooted. If, however, CNMC, a Chinese SOE, is said to trivialize the safety of Zambian workers, while Western-based mining firms do
not, what are readers to infer, other than that this is a “Chinese” practice?  That is precisely what the media did infer. If a Chinese SOE is
unwilling to carry out in Zambia better practices than in its home country, what are readers to infer, other than that it has a disregard for the
lives of Zambians, which Western-based firms do not? That is what the media inferred, despite the practices of Western-based firms in Zambia
that are worse than they are back in Canada, Australia, etc., while CNMC’s practices in Zambia are better than those of most mining firms
operating in China.
There are distinctive aspects of Chinese investment in Zambian copper mining, but in the main Chinese firms operate like other foreign
investors in the industry. They are da tong xiao yi (more alike than different), as Chinese say.  The biggest difference between CNMC and
other foreign investors is not “the worst” safety record (which doesn’t exist) or lower wages (explicable, albeit not justifiable), but a difference
that redounds to the benefit of Zambian miners.  It is that CNMC as an SOE is conscious of political factors.  Western governments cannot
ensure that their citizen firms provide secure jobs in Zambia; it would likely be illegal, under their national laws, for them to do so, regardless of
what International Labor Organization standards may prescribe about job security.  Yet, Chinese SOEs, despite in other respects practicing
basically the same form of exploitation as others, can do just that.
In mining in Africa, there are also massive human rights violations, including by Western firms, many of which have varying degrees of home
government backing, but thus far HRW has chosen to single out a Chinese SOE, along with a report on the Western-sanctioned Zimbabwean
government  (a December 6, 2011 HRW report about child miners in Mali, published after its report on CNMC, is on an uncontroversial topic).
The HRW report in fact tells us more about the political agenda of HRW than about Chinese activities in Africa.  Presenting itself as a golden
effort to secure improved labor rights, it turns out to be yet another contribution to China bashing; the HRW report is, as Chinese say, jin yu qi
biao, bai xu qi zhong, gilded outside, shoddy within.
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